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Introduction	  
	  In	   1946	   the	   economist	   Arthur	   Burns	   defined	   a	   business	   cycle	   as	   a	   period	   of	  expansion	  occurring	  about	  the	  same	  time	  in	  many	  economic	  activities,	  followed	  by	   similar	   general	   recessions,	   contractions	   and	   revivals,	  which	  merge	   into	   the	  expansion	   phase	   of	   the	   next	   cycle.	   Cycles	   may	   take	   from	   one	   year	   to	   ten	   or	  twelve	   years.	   Milton	   Friedman	   argued	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   “cycle”	   was	   a	  misnomer	  as	  business	  declines	  are	  more	  of	  a	  monetary	  phenomenon.	  	  In	   this	   paper	   it	   will	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   increase	   and	   decrease	   in	   individual	  household	   debts	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   especially	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   variety	   of	   home	  mortgages,	  was	  responsible	  for	  causing	  the	  latest	  cycle	  period.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	   the	   cycle	   started	   in	   1998	   when	   overfunding	   became	   apparent.	  “Overfunding”	   occurs	   when	   mortgage	   funds	   are	   not	   only	   used	   to	   build	   new	  homes,	  but	  also	  to	  cause	  house	  prices	  to	  exceed	  the	  CPI	  indexed	  levels.	  In	  2004	  and	  2006	  68%	  of	  all	  new	  mortgage	  funding	  was	  used	  to	  cause	  such	  excess	  and	  only	  32%	  of	  the	  funding	  was	  used	  for	  building	  new	  homes.	  	  	  The	   recession	   sets	   in	   when	   doubts	   arise	   about	   the	   ability	   of	   individual	  households	  to	  continue	  to	  service	  their	  long-­‐term	  debts.	  Such	  doubts	  came	  into	  the	  open	  in	  2007	  when	  the	  liquidity	  for	  U.S.	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  dried	  up.	  	  The	   contraction	  was	   characterized	  by	   a	   turn	   around	   from	  a	   lending	   expansion	  period	   to	   a	   forceful	   reduction	   in	   outstanding	   debt	   through	   foreclosure	  proceedings	  and	  home	  repossessions.	  The	  period	  of	  “underfunding”	  started.	  The	  contraction	  resulted	  in	  substantial	  job	  losses,	  income	  losses	  for	  households	  and	  a	  switch	   to	   use	   incomes	   to	   reduce	   debt	   levels.	   The	   latter	   set	   off	   the	   reduced	  demand	  levels	  for	  other	  goods	  and	  services.	  The	  households	  most	  affected	  were	  the	   lower	   and	   middle-­‐income	   families,	   whose	   livelihood	   depends	   on	   income	  earnings	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  use	  and	  benefits	  of	  savings.	  	  The	   tax	   revenues	   of	   the	   U.S.	   (Federal,	   State	   and	   Local)	   government	   were	   also	  seriously	  affected.	  The	  annual	  tax	  revenues	  dropped	  by	  $1.5	  trillion	  in	  fiscal	  year	  2009	  as	  compared	  to	  fiscal	  year	  2007;	  a	  drop	  of	  29%.	  	  The	   Federal	   Reserve’s	   efforts	   to	   create	   a	   compensatory	   overfunding	   situation	  through	   Quantitative	   Easing:	   a	   $4.2	   trillion	   exercise	   in	   buying	   up	   government	  and	   mortgage	   bonds,	   did	   not	   directly	   address	   the	   financial	   pressures	   on	  individual	   households.	   It	   helped	   the	   savers,	   who	   saw	   their	   financial	   assets	  increase	   in	   values,	   but	   not	   the	   borrowers	   who	   saw	   their	   jobs	   disappear	   and	  income	  levels	  drop.	  In	  a	  way	  the	  rich	  got	  richer,	  but	  the	  poor	  got	  much	  poorer.	  Inequality	  was	  enhanced.	  	  There	  is	  another	  way	  and	  this	  paper	  highlights	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  overfunding	  to	   individual	  households,	  once	  a	  recession	  sets	   in.	  Such	  method	  works	  directly,	  rather	  than	  indirectly,	  and	  shortens	  the	  contraction	  period.	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1.1	  The	  overfunding	  process:	  the	  volume	  effects	  
	  In	  a	  recent	  paper:	  The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing1,	   the	  use	  of	   long-­‐term	  debt	   funding	   for	   the	  acquisition	  of	  homes	  by	  U.S.	  individual	  households	  was	  demonstrated.	  	  Two	  elements	  stand	  out:	   the	  volumes	  of	   funds	   lend	  and	  the	  quality	  standards	  -­‐lending	  criteria-­‐	  applied	  to	  such	  funds	  provided.	  	  From	   the	   Balance	   Sheet	   of	   Households	   and	   Non-­‐profit	   Organizations	   as	  published	  on	  a	  quarterly	  basis	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  St.	  Louis2,	  one	  can	  deduce	  the	  increase/decrease	  in	  outstanding	  U.S.	  mortgage	  amounts.	  In	  1997	  the	  increase	  was	  $180	  billion,	  by	  2002	  this	  amount	  was	  already	  nearly	  four	  times	  the	  1997	  increase	  at	  $706	  billion.	  The	  volumes	  increased	  further	  to	  $1053	  billion	  in	  2005	  and	  stayed	  high	   in	  2006	  with	  $998	  billion	  and	   in	  2007	  with	  $701	  billion.	  From	   2008	   the	   period	   of	   underfunding	   started	   as	   the	   increases	   turned	   to	  decreases	  that	  continued	  over	  the	  whole	  period	  to	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2014.	  	  1997	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  base	  year	  of	  comparison.	  The	  housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  of	  that	  year	  on	  an	  annualized	  basis	  were	  1.437	  million	  new	  homes.	  Per	  each	  new	  home	   the	   average	   debt	   incurred	  was	   approximately	   $125,300,	   well	   below	   the	  median	   house	   price	   of	   $145,900.	   	   In	   1998	   the	   level	   of	   the	   net	   increase	   in	  outstanding	  mortgage	  levels	  was	  $301	  billion,	  the	  median	  home	  price	  based	  on	  the	   CPI	   increase	  was	   $148,234	   and	   therefore	   the	   number	   of	   homes	   that	   could	  have	  been	  built	  would	  have	  been	  2.031	  million.	  The	   actual	   number	  of	   housing	  starts	   per	   1	   July	   1998	   annualized	  was	   1.698	  million.	   The	   overfunding	   process	  had	  started.	  	  In	  1998	  the	   increase	   in	  mortgage	  amounts	  outstanding	  were	  no	   longer	  used	  to	  exclusively	  build	  more	  homes,	   but	   also	   to	   increase	   the	  price	  of	   existing	  homes	  above	   the	   CPI	   inflation	   level.	   In	   1998	   such	   applications	   of	   funds	   for	   the	   latter	  purpose	  only	  constituted	  16.3%	  of	  the	  funds	  used.	  By	  2004	  and	  2006	  the	  use	  of	  funds	  to	  increase	  house	  prices	  above	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  level	  had	  gone	  up	  to	  68%	  of	   all	  new	   funds	  applied.	  A	  different	  way	   to	  describe	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  volume	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  funding	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  number	  of	  homes	  that	  could	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing	  by	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning,	  7th	  February	  2015,	  http://mpra.ub.ubi-­‐muenchen.de/61970/.	  	  1	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-­‐5.pdf	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  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  been	  built	   if	  house	  prices	  had	  moved	  up	  with	   the	  CPI	   index.	   In	  1998	  the	  result	  would	  have	  been	  2.031million	  new	  homes.	  Given	  that	  the	  need	  for	  new	  homes	  in	  the	  U.S.	  is	  around	  1.8	  million	  per	  annum,	  this	  would	  have	  meant	  an	  oversupply	  of	  homes.	  In	  actual	  numbers	  only	  1.698	  housing	  starts	  were	  made.	  	  This	  potential	  oversupply	  increased	  practically	  every	  year	  from	  1998	  to	  2005.	  In	  the	   latter	   year	   the	   increase	   in	  mortgage	   funds	  would	  have	  made	   it	   possible	   to	  build	   5.925	   million	   new	   homes	   if	   median	   house	   prices	   had	   followed	   the	   CPI	  index.	  The	  actual	  number	  of	  new	  housing	  starts	  in	  2005	  was	  2.054	  million.	  	  A	  third	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  overfunding	  process	  is	  to	  calculate	  how	  much	  of	  the	  increase	   in	  mortgage	  money	  each	  year	  was	  applied	   to	  each	  new	  home	  start.	   In	  1997	  each	  new	  home	  start	  had	  an	  amount	  in	  new	  mortgage	  funding	  allocated	  to	  it	  of	  $125,260	  that	  was	  below	  the	  median	  house	  price	  in	  that	  year.	  It	  quickly	  rose	  to	   $426,590	   in	  2002,	   to	   reach	   its	  maximum	   in	  2006	  with	   $574,550.	   In	  2007	   it	  dropped	  somewhat	  to	  $517,730	  however	  still	  more	  than	  four	  times	  the	  amount	  needed	  in	  1997.	  	  One	  may	  draw	  the	  conclusion	  out	  of	  the	  above	  that	  the	  overfunding	  trend	  started	  in	  1998	  and	  did	  continue	  to	  2007.	  	  
1.2	  The	  overfunding	  process:	  the	  quality	  standards	  applied	  
	  Much	   has	   already	   been	   written	   about	   the	   U.S.	   sub-­‐prime	   mortgage	   lending	  experience.	   In	   the	   previous	   section	   it	  was	   stated	   that	   the	   overfunding	   process	  started	   in	  1998	  and	   that	  by	  2002	  each	  new	  home	   start	   already	   required	  more	  than	  three	  times	  the	  amount	  of	  borrowed	  money	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  base	  year	  1997.	   The	   overfunding	   process	  was	   already	  well	   on	   its	   way	   before	   2004.	   The	  year	  2004	  is	  important	  as	  in	  this	  year	  the	  quality	  standards	  –the	  lending	  criteria-­‐	  of	   granting	  mortgages	  were	   changed	   dramatically.	   The	   process	  was	   started	   to	  sell	  mortgages	  to	  lower	  income	  groups	  on	  basis	  of	  “attractive	  terms”.	  Such	  terms	  were	  low	  start	  up	  interest	  rates	  –the	  adjustable	  rate	  mortgages-­‐,	  whereby	  for	  the	  initial	   two	   years	   interest	   charges	   were	   kept	   below	   real	   interest	   costs.	   Such	  rolling	  up	  of	  interest	  costs	  made	  it	  look	  to	  the	  mortgagee	  as	  if	  they	  could	  afford	  the	  mortgage	  payments.	  A	   second	  method	  was	   to	   require	  no	  down	  payment,	   a	  100%	  mortgage	  of	  the	  amount	  needed	  to	  acquire	  a	  home.	  A	  third	  method	  used	  was	  to	  require	  no	  repayment	  element	  in	  the	  mortgage,	  often	  called	  an	  interest-­‐only	  mortgage.	  	  Of	  course,	  for	  these	  types	  of	  mortgages	  buyers	  were	  easily	  found.	  The	  risk	  profile	  of	  the	  lenders	  deteriorated	  with	  every	  new	  mortgage	  granted	  on	  the	  new	  terms.	  What	   should	   be	   remembered	   is	   that	   by	   2008	   the	   volume	   of	   such	   sub-­‐prime	  mortgages	   had	   reached	   about	   $1.2	   trillion	   out	   of	   a	   total	  mortgage	   portfolio	   of	  well	  over	  $10	  trillion.	  The	  deterioration	  process	  started	  in	  2004	  when	  18%	  of	  all	  new	  mortgages	  granted	  were	  sub-­‐prime	  ones;	  this	  percentage	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  increased	  to	  20%	  in	  2005	  and	  reached	  21%	  in	  2006.	  Before	  2004	  the	  percentage	  had	  varied	  between	  8	  and	  10%	  of	  all	  new	  mortgages	  granted.	  	  In	  2004	  and	  later	  years,	  banks,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  investment	  banks	  and	  the	  credit	  rating	   agencies,	   started	   to	   offload	   their	  mortgage	   portfolios	   to	   outside	   buyers:	  mutual	  funds,	  pension	  funds,	  high	  net	  worth	  individuals	  and	  even	  money	  market	  funds.	   This	   was	   done	   through	   the	   securitization	   process	   of	   mortgage-­‐backed	  securities.	  All	  these	  buyers	  –both	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  abroad-­‐	  were	  sold	  products	  that	  had	  elements	  of	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgages	  in	  them.	  	  	  The	  credit	   rating	  agencies	  often	  rated	   these	  securities	  as	  having	  an	   investment	  grade	  quality.	  	  	  For	  the	  banks	  the	  process	  was	  attractive	  in	  that	  less	  equity	  capital	  was	  tied	  up	  in	  mortgage	  lending	  and	  new	  loans	  could	  be	  initiated.	  Banks	  also	  continued	  to	  run	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  sold	  mortgage	  portfolios;	  another	  source	  of	  profits.	  	  For	   some	   investors	   the	   process	   looked	   too	   good	   to	   be	   true	   as	   U.S.	   insurance	  companies	   offered	   to	   insure	   the	   credit	   risks	   over	   the	  mortgage-­‐backed	   bonds	  through	  credit	  default	  swaps.	  	  Already	   in	   2007	   doubts	   began	   to	   appear	   about	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   mortgage-­‐backed	  securities.	  On	  the	  9th	  of	  August	  2007	  BNP	  Paribas	  suspended	  three	  of	  its	  funds.	  It	  declared	  that: “the	  complete	  evaporation	  of	  liquidity	  in	  certain	  market	  segments	   of	   the	   U.S.	   securitization	   market	   has	   made	   it	   impossible	   to	   value	  certain	  assets	  fairly	  regardless	  of	  their	  quality	  or	  credit	  rating."	  	  	  Investors	   and	   funds	   linked	   to	   investors	   depend	   on	   short-­‐term	   liquidity	   to	  measure	  the	  value	  of	  a	  portfolio.	  Banks	  need	  an	  equity	  buffer	  to	  absorb	  potential	  losses,	  but	  investment	  funds	  do	  not	  require	  such	  buffer.	  Their	  value	  is	  based	  on	  daily	  quotations	  in	  the	  securities	  markets.	  Long	  term	  lending	  clashed	  with	  short-­‐	  term	  liquidity	  considerations.	  	  The	   lowering	   of	   the	   mortgage	   quality	   standards	   as	   applied	   from	   2004	   did	  worsen	   the	  overfunding	  process	   in	   two	  ways:	   (1)	   It	   accelerated	   the	  process	  of	  overfunding	   further	   and	   (2)	   By	   attracting	   funding	   from	   outside	   the	   banking	  sector,	   it	   had	   moved	   the	   goal	   posts	   away	   from	   banks	   -­‐they	   needed	   an	   equity	  buffer	   to	   underwrite	   such	   mortgage	   risks-­‐	   to	   investors	   who	   relied	   on	   daily	  assessments	  of	  such	  long	  term	  debt	  obligations	  without	  having	  the	  luxury	  of	  an	  equity	  buffer.	  	  
1.3	  The	  overfunding	  process:	  why	  is	  it	  so	  destructive?	  
	  Why	  do	  borrowers	  borrow	  for	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  home?	  In	  nearly	  all	  cases	  such	  borrowers	  borrow	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  savings	  or	  income	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  acquisition	  outright.	  This	  puts	  borrowers	  in	  a	  disadvantaged	  group	  as	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  compared	  to	  wealthy	  households	  who	  can	  afford	  to	  pay	  cash	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  home.	  The	  wealthy	  households	  also	  include	  those	  who	  have	  had	  the	  benefit	  of	  paying	  back	  most	  of	  their	  mortgage	  already,	  usually	  the	  elder	  generation.	  	  	  Usually,	   the	   elder	   generation	   has	   had	   the	   historic	   benefit	   of	   wages	   and	   salary	  growth	  in	  line	  or	  above	  the	  CPI	  index	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time.	  	  This	   puts	   households	   with	   a	   high	  multiple	   of	   a	   mortgage	   loan	   to	   income	   in	   a	  strongly	  disadvantaged	  position.	  On	  a	  micro	  level	  this	  is	  the	  case	  because	  such	  a	  household	  needs	  a	  continuing	  and	  growing	  income	  level	  to	  pay	  back	  the	  debt	  and	  enjoy	   the	   benefits	   of	   economic	   growth.	   On	   a	   micro	   level	   newcomers	   to	   the	  housing	  market	  are	  worse	  off	  than	  those	  who	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  buy	  a	  property	  in	   earlier	   years,	   ever	   since	   house	   price	   rises	   started	   to	   exceed	   the	   CPI	   level.	  Overfunding	  requires	  a	  relatively	  higher	  and	  higher	  share	  of	  newcomers’	  income	  in	  order	  to	  buy	  a	  home,	  leaving	  less	  cash	  available	  for	  other	  purchases.	  	  	  On	   a	  macro	   level,	   overfunding	   increases	   the	   risks	   over	   the	  whole	   outstanding	  mortgage	   debt.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   same	   level	   of	   income	   adjusted	   for	   CPI	  inflation	   does	   no	   longer	   buy	   the	   same	   number	   of	   homes;	   it	   increases	   house	  prices	  above	  the	  CPI	  level	  as	  well.	  The	  debt	  volume	  per	  new	  home	  goes	  up	  and	  exceeds	  the	  income	  capacity	  to	  service	  such	  debt	  levels.	  Risks	  go	  up!	  	  	  The	   lowering	   of	   lending	   standards	   from	   2004	   onwards	   only	   added	   fuel	   to	   a	  simmering	   discrepancy	   between	   income	   levels	   and	   house	   prices.	   The	   macro	  economic	   mortgage	   portfolio	   risks	   were	   multiplied	   by	   adding	   lower	   quality	  products	   to	   the	  mortgage	   range	   at	   a	   time	  when	  much	  of	   the	  mortgage	   lending	  was	  already	  fuelling	  house	  prices	  to	  exceed	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  level.	  	  The	  securitization	  of	  mortgage	  portfolios	  was	  executed	  at	  a	  time	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  that	   did	   not	   stabilize	   mortgage	   markets,	   but	   made	   such	   markets	   even	   more	  prone	   to	  collapse.	  Daily	  price	  setting	   for	   long	   term	  borrowing	   levels	   is	   rarely	  a	  good	  thing,	  but	  to	  do	  this	  with	  lower	  quality	  products	  included	  in	  such	  securities	  was	  asking	  for	  trouble	  and	  so	  it	  did.	  The	  trouble	  was	  compounded	  in	  that	  buyers	  were	  often	  misled	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  securities.	  	  The	   financial	   regulators	   left	   it	   to	   the	   financial	   markets	   to	   set	   standards	   for	  volume	  growth	  and	  quality	  control.	  Competition	  among	  banks	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  managed	   volume	   pattern	   in	  macro	   lending	   levels.	   Collective	  management	   was	  needed	  but	  was	  not	  applied.	  Increasing	  the	  macro-­‐economic	  risk	  profile	  through	  adding	  lower	  quality	  products	  was	  also	  left	  unchecked,	  as	  was	  the	  securitization	  process.	   No	   government	   agency	  managed	   the	   volume	   growth	   in	   the	  mortgage	  market	  or	  applied	  quality	  control	  measures.	  	  The	  result	  was	  the	  2008	  economic	  collapse.	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2	  From	  overfunding	  to	  underfunding	  
	  Two	  things	  happen	  when	  mortgage	  debts	  are	  outstanding	  and	  are	  not	  fully	  being	  serviced	   any	   longer:	   (1)	   Banks	   go	   after	   the	   individual	   households	   who	   are	   in	  arrears,	  initially	  by	  starting	  foreclosure	  proceedings	  and	  secondly	  by	  going	  after	  	  the	  main	  asset:	  the	  home	  and	  (2)	  Banks	  tighten	  their	  lending	  criteria,	  when	  they	  expect	  a	  downward	  pressure	  on	  house	  prices.	  	  The	  next	  table3	  and	  table	  2	  can	  illustrate	  these	  facts.	  	  






2004	   	  	  	  640,000	   	  
2005	   	  	  	  801,563	   	  
2006	   1,215,304	   	  	  	  268,532	  
2007	   2,203,295	   	  	  	  489,000	  
2008	   3,019,482	   	  	  	  679,000	  
2009	   3,457,649	   	  	  	  945,000	  
2010	   3,843,548	   1,125,000	  
2011	   3,920,418	   1,147,000	  
2012	   2,300,000	   	  	  	  700,000	  
2013	   1,369,405	   	  	  	  463,108	  	  Table	   2	   illustrates	   the	   drop	   in	   outstanding	  mortgage	   amounts	   over	   the	   period	  2008-­‐20144.	  	  





Annual	   Change	   in	   outstanding	  
mortgage	  liabilities	  
x	  U.S.$	  billion	  
2007	   	  	  	  	  +	  703	  
2008	   	  	  	  	  -­‐	  	  	  	  33	  
2009	   	  	  	  	  -­‐	  161	  
2010	   	  	  	  	  -­‐	  504	  
2011	   	  	  	  	  -­‐	  216	  
2012	   	  	  	  	  -­‐	  193	  
2013	   	  	  	  	  -­‐	  	  	  89	  
2014	  End	  of	  Quarter	  3	   	  	  	  +	  	  12.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-­‐foreclosure-­‐statistics/	  	  4	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/current/annuals/a2005-­‐2013.pdf	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  main	  cause	  of	  the	  business	  cycle©	  Drs	  Kees	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  According	  to	  U.S.	  market	  insiders,	  the	  house	  price	  boom	  ended	  in	  August	  2005.	  From	  June	  2006	  to	  June	  2009	  median	  U.S.	  house	  prices	  dropped	  by	  34%.	  In	  the	  paper	  mentioned	  earlier,	  in	  2004	  and	  2006	  the	  volume	  of	  funds	  allocated	  to	  fund	  house	  price	  rises	  above	  the	  CPI	  index	  had	  reached	  68%	  of	  all	  new	  funding	  levels.	  Overfunding	  had	  reached	  its	  peak.	  	  	  One	  may	  argue	  about	  whether	   the	  overfunding	  process	  or	   the	  securitization	  of	  home	  mortgage	  loans	  or	  the	  softening	  of	  lending	  criteria	  was	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  switch	  from	  overfunding	  to	  underfunding.	  In	  the	  end	  the	  probability	   is	  that	  all	  three	  factors	  played	  a	  role,	  but	  that	  the	  volumes	  of	  mortgage	  lending	  and	  the	  softening	  of	  the	  lending	  criteria	  were	  most	  to	  blame.	  The	  securitization	  process	  was	  flawed	  in	  that	  credit	  risks	  were	  not	  properly	  recognized	  in	  the	  grading	  levels	  granted	  by	  the	  credit	  rating	  agencies.	  	  	  
2.1	  Economic	  consequences	  of	  the	  switch	  to	  underfunding	  	  In	  the	  paper:	  “The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing”,	  it	  was	  calculated	  that	  over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2007	   overfunding	   the	   mortgage	   markets	   had	   added	   about	   $4	   trillion	   in	  mortgage	  debt,	  which	  was	  not	  used	  for	  the	  purpose	  to	  build	  new	  homes	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  CPI	  index.	  	  	  When	  the	  doubtful	  debtor	  levels	  go	  up,	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  fund	  suppliers	  is	  to	  go	  after	  the	  borrowers	  to	  settle	  outstanding	  debt	  levels	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  reduce	  the	  volume	  of	  new	  debt.	  	  At	  this	  stage	  the	  overfunding	  process	  has	  finished	  and	  the	  underfunding	  stage	  starts.	  	  Tables	  1	  and	  2	  showed	  the	  experience	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  There	  are	  a	  series	  of	  consequences	  of	  such	  switch	  in	  economic	  behavior.	  	  	  They	  affect	  a	  number	  of	  economic	  variables	  both	   in	  asset	  prices	  and	   in	   income	  flows:	   	  
• The	  market	  values	  of	  household	  owner-­‐occupied	  real	  estate;	  	  
• The	  market	  values	  of	  corporate	  equities	  held	  by	  individual	  households;	  	  
• The	  market	  values	  of	  proprietors’	  equity	  in	  noncorporate	  business;	  	  
• The	  level	  of	  unemployment	  and	  the	  labor	  force	  participation	  rate;	  	  
• The	  levels	  of	  income	  growth	  out	  of	  employment;	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The	  market	  values	  of	  household	  owner-­‐occupied	  real	  estate	  	  Over	   the	   period	   2006-­‐2011	   the	   market	   values	   of	   owner-­‐occupied	   real	   estate	  came	  down	  from	  $22.7	  trillion	  in	  2006	  to	  $16.1	  trillion	  in	  2011.	  This	  was	  a	  loss	  of	   $6.6	   trillion	   in	  market	   values.	   These	   losses	   are	   nominal	   losses	   and	   are	   not	  corrected	  for	  the	  CPI	  index.	  If	  the	  latter	  inflation	  levels	  had	  been	  incorporated	  in	  the	  data	  calculation,	  the	  losses	  would	  have	  been	  more	  substantial.	  From	  2012	  to	  the	  third	  quarter	  2014	  the	  upward	  trend	  resumed	  and	  the	  latest	  data	  end	  of	  3rd	  quarter	   2014	   showed	   that	   such	   values	   have	   risen	   to	   $20.4	   trillion	   in	   nominal	  terms.	  	  
The	  market	  values	  of	  corporate	  equities	  held	  by	  individual	  households	  
	  The	  market	  values	  of	  corporate	  equities	  held	  directly	  by	   individual	  households	  stood	   at	   $9.632	   trillion	   as	   per	   the	   end	   of	   2007	   and	  was	   reduced	   in	   values	   to	  $5.760	  trillion	  as	  per	   the	  end	  of	  2008.	  By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  3rd	  quarter	  2014	  such	  values	  had	  improved	  to	  $12.885	  trillion.	  The	  actual	  equity	  holdings	  of	  individual	  households	  are	  more	  substantial	   than	  the	  direct	  holdings	  as	  pension	  funds	  and	  life	  insurance	  companies	  also	  hold	  equities	  on	  behalf	  of	  individual	  households.	  	  
The	  market	  values	  of	  proprietors’	  equity	  in	  noncorporate	  business	  
	  The	   market	   value	   of	   proprietors’	   equity	   in	   noncorporate	   business	   stood	   at	  	  $9.341	   trillion	   by	   the	   end	   of	   2007.	   By	   2009	   it	   had	   reached	   its	   lowest	   level	   at	  $6.481	   trillion,	   to	   climb	   back	   up	   to	   $9.188	   trillion	   as	   per	   the	   end	   of	   the	   3rd	  quarter	  of	  2014.	  
	  
The	  level	  of	  unemployment	  and	  the	  labor	  force	  participation	  rate	  
	  In	  the	  short	  period	  of	  January	  2008	  to	  October	  2009	  7.8	  million	  Americans	  lost	  their	  jobs.	  With	  such	  job	  losses	  also	  comes	  an	  income	  loss,	  which	  is	  affecting	  the	  ability	   to	   continue	   servicing	   the	   debt	   levels	   that	   these	   individuals	   may	   have	  incurred.	  In	  2007	  the	  annual	  unemployment	  rate	  in	  the	  U.S.	  was	  4.6%,	  by	  2008	  it	  had	   gone	   up	   to	   5.8%.	   In	   2009	   it	   drastically	   increased	   to	   9.3%	   and	   increased	  further	   in	   2010	   to	   9.6%	   to	   drop	   back	   to	   6.2%	   in	   2014	   and	   according	   to	   the	  January	  2015	  statistics	  it	  continued	  to	  drop	  to	  5.7%.	  	  What	   is	   also	  noteworthy	   is	   that	   the	   labor	   force	  participation	   rate	  has	   shown	  a	  steady	   decline	   since	   January	   2007.	   In	   this	   month	   the	   rate	   was	   66.4%	   and	   by	  January	   2015	   it	   had	   declined	   to	   62.9%.	   In	   practical	   terms	   it	  means	   that	   fewer	  individuals	   of	   those	   able	   to	  work	   chose	   not	   to.	   In	   income	   terms	   it	  means	   less	  generation	  of	  incomes.	  In	  a	  recent	  paper:	  “Understanding	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  labor	  	  	  	  	  
	   11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Overfunding	  and	  underfunding,	  a	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  business	  cycle©	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  force	   participation	   rate	   in	   the	   U.S.”5	  five	   top	   economists	   (Steven	   Braun	   and	  others)	   have	   set	   out	   the	   main	   reasons	   for	   the	   drop	   in	   the	   labor	   force	  participation	  rate.	  	  	  
The	  levels	  of	  income	  growth	  out	  of	  employment	  
	  The	   pattern	   that	   income	   growth	   equals	   or	   outstrips	   the	   CPI	   index	   was	  discontinued	   after	   2008.	   In	   2013	   the	   real	  median	   income	   level	  was	   8%	   lower	  than	  the	  2007	  pre-­‐recession	  level	  of	  $56,435.	  What	  it	  means	  is	  that	  the	  changed	  pattern	   offered	   a	   lower	   ability	   to	   service	   nominal	   debts,	   when	   incomes	   grow	  slower	  than	  CPI	  inflation	  levels.	  	  
The	  level	  of	  tax	  revenues	  
	  When	  unemployment	  rates	  go	  up,	  when	  incomes	  grow	  slower	  than	  before,	  when	  the	  pressure	  to	  repay	  debts	  is	  jacked	  up	  and	  when	  new	  lending	  is	  slowed	  down,	  it	   all	   points	   to	   a	   recession.	   Tax	   revenues	   are	   closely	   linked	   to	   economic	  performance,	  so	   it	   should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	   that	   tax	  revenues	  dropped	  after	  2007.	   The	   total	   level	   of	   revenues	   for	   the	   U.S.	   Federal,	   States	   and	   local	  governments	   were	   $5.170	   trillion	   in	   fiscal	   year	   2007.	   This	   level	   of	   revenues	  dropped	  to	  $4.667	  trillion	  in	  2008	  and	  a	  further	  drop	  to	  $3.665	  trillion	  in	  2009.	  No	  government	  can	  lower	  its	  expenditure	  level	  by	  just	  over	  $1.5	  trillion	  or	  29%	  in	  just	  two	  years;	  neither	  should	  it	  attempt	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  	  
2.2	  Some	  conclusions	  
	  The	  prime	  conclusion	  out	  of	  the	  above	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  difference	  between	  mortgage	  debt	  incurred	  by	  an	  individual	  household	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  increase	  or	  decrease	  in	  the	  macro-­‐economic	  mortgage	  debt	  levels.	  The	  difference	  is	  one	  of	  a	  time	  period.	  At	  a	  specific	  moment	  in	  time,	  an	  individual	  household	  buys	  a	  home	  at	   a	   market	   price.	   The	   individual	   cannot	   deal	   at	   past	   or	   future	   house	   prices.	  However	  over,	  say	  a	  year,	  the	  collective	  volume	  of	  funds	  allocated	  to	  mortgages	  can	   cause	   house	   prices	   to	  move	   above	   the	   CPI	   level.	   Income	   levels	   and	   house	  price	   movements	   diverge,	   which	   leads	   to	   greater	   risks	   over	   the	   collective	  mortgage	  portfolio.	  	  	  A	  second	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  benign	  neglect	  by	  the	  regulators,	  relying	  totally	   on	   self-­‐regulation	   of	   the	   markets,	   was	   based	   on	   a	   misconception	   what	  financial	  markets	   can	  do.	  Banks	  and	  securities	   companies	   can	  achieve	  what	  no	  commercial	   company	  can	  do:	  by	  collectively	   lending	  more	   in	  a	  period	   they	  can	  achieve	  an	  increase	  in	  fixed	  asset	  prices	  (homes)	  above	  the	  CPI	  level	  and	  above	  the	   average	   income	   growth	   of	   individual	   households.	   If	   such	   divergence	   –the	  overfunding	   process-­‐	   is	   not	   counteracted	   the	   risks	   to	   incomes	   multiply	   and	  ultimately	  the	  doubtful	  debtor	  levels	  will	  cause	  the	  reverse	  movements.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  http://www.voxeu.org/article/decline-­‐labour-­‐force-­‐participation-­‐us	  
	   12	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Overfunding	  and	  underfunding,	  a	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  business	  cycle©	  Drs	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  A	   third	  conclusion	   is	   that	  when	  doubtful	  debtor	   levels	  start	   to	   increase,	  mainly	  do	  to	  overfunding	  and	  lowering	  the	  credit	  risk	  parameters,	  the	  whole	  process	  is	  turned	   around	   into	   an	   underfunding	   situation.	   Unemployment	   levels	   increase,	  the	   labor	   force	   participation	   ratios	   decline,	   average	   household’	   incomes	   drop	  relatively	  to	  the	  CPI	  level	  and	  tax	  revenues	  decline.	  	  A	   fourth	   conclusion	   is	   that	  worldwide	   government	  debt	   levels	   can	   show	  many	  similarities	   to	   mortgage	   debt.	   After	   all	   individual	   households	   carry	   the	   main	  responsibility	  for	  maintaining	  the	  level	  of	  tax	  revenues.	  Government	  debt	  is	  of	  an	  even	  longer	  nature	  than	  mortgage	  debt.	  	  A	   fifth	  conclusion	   is	   that	  Quantitative	  Easing	  as	  was	  applied	   in	   the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  U.K.	   and	   is	   started	   up	   by	   the	   ECB	  works	   as	   a	   slow	  medicine	   to	   counteract	   the	  onset	  of	  underfunding.	  Buying	  up	  government	  bonds	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  U.S.	  also	   mortgage	   bonds	   does	   not	   relieve	   individual	   households	   from	   the	   pain	   of	  absolute	   and	   relative	   income	   reductions.	   As	   shown	   in	   above	   tables	   the	   U.S.	  recuperation	   period	   has	   taken	   nearly	   six	   years,	   rather	   than	   one	   or	   two.	   A	  different	  form	  of	  QE	  could	  have	  been	  applied.	  	  A	   sixth	   conclusion	   is	   that	   in	   a	   debt	   recovery	   period,	   lowering	   of	   interest	   rates	  does	  not	  improve	  the	  creditworthiness	  of	  individual	  households.	  They	  are	  in	  no	  position	   to	   take	   up	   more	   credit.	   Over	   the	   period	   2008-­‐3rd	   quarter	   2014	  individual	  households	  reduced	  their	  outstanding	  mortgage	  loans	  by	  $1.2	  trillion.	  This	   fact	   shows	   how	   ineffective	   the	   lowering	   of	   interest	   rates	   has	   been	   for	  individual	  households.	  
	  
	  
3	  How	  to	  shorten	  the	  recovery	  period	  
	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  it	  becomes	  easier	  to	  outline	  not	  only	  what	  has	  gone	  wrong	   since	   1998,	   but	   also	   what	   did	   not	   work	   as	   fast	   as	   might	   have	   been	  expected.	  	  Firstly	  the	  dogma	  that	  financial	  markets	  can	  control	  themselves,	  as	  promoted	  by	  business	   insiders,	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   a	   wrong	   dogma.	   The	   reasons	   are	   that	  competition	  among	  banks,	  investment	  banks,	  Fannie	  Mae,	  Freddy	  Mac	  and	  many	  near-­‐banks,	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   volume	   control	   in	   mortgage	   lending.	   A	   single	  financial	  institution	  cannot	  address	  the	  implications	  of	  overfunding.	  	  Secondly	  competition	  among	  banks	  as	  well	  by	  state	  sponsored	  enterprises	  such	  as	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac	  can	   lead	  to	  downgrading	  risk	   levels	   in	  order	   to	  attract	  customers.	  This	  was	  clearly	  the	  case	  with	  the	   introduction	  of	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgages.	   The	   timing	   was	   wrong:	   the	   increased	   speed	   of	   the	   sales	   of	   such	  products	  was	  at	  a	  time	  when	  overfunding	  had	  nearly	  reached	  its	  peak	  already.	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4	  The	  economic	  growth	  incentive	  method	  (EGIM)	  
	  The	   analysis	   in	   this	   paper	   has	   led	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   since	   1998	   excessive	  levels	  of	  mortgage	  debts	  added	  by	  sub-­‐prime	  lending	  standards	  were	  the	  causes	  of	   increasing	   risks	   levels	   over	   the	   total	   outstanding	   mortgage	   portfolio.	   The	  higher	   risks	   invoked	   more	   doubtful	   debtors.	   The	   shift	   from	   higher	   to	   lower	  lending	  levels	  and	  the	  efforts	  to	  get	  outstanding	  debts	  repaid	  as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  led	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008.	  	  At	  the	  turn	  from	  overfunding	  to	  underfunding,	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  one	  of	  assets	  or	  their	  valuations,	  but	  of	  incomes:	  the	  income	  levels	  of	  the	  borrowers.	  The	  key	  factor	  was	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  borrowers	  to	  keep	  up	  their	  debt	  service	  levels.	  	  The	  underfunding	  cycle	  affects	  all	  households.	  Therefore	  to	  be	  fair	  to	  the	  whole	  U.S.	   population,	   a	   cash	   payment	   of	   a	   fixed	   amount	   to	   all	   households	   would	  benefit	  each	  household.	  Proportionally	   the	   lower	   income	  classes	  do	  benefit	   the	  most.	  	  The	  EGIM	  method	  could	  work	  as	  follows:	  	  In	   2007	   the	   average	  median	   household	   income	  was	   $50,740.6.	   The	   number	   of	  individual	   households	   was	   116	   783	   000.7	  If	   in	   2008,	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   had	  decided,	  with	  approval	  from	  the	  Houses	  of	  Congress,	  to	  advance	  tax	  free	  4%	  or	  $2030	   to	   every	   individual	   household,	   the	   total	   bill	   would	   have	   come	   to	   $237	  billion.	   If	   in	  2009	  3%	  had	  been	  advanced,	  the	  bill	  would	  have	  been	  about	  $180	  billion	  and	  for	  2010	  2%	  with	  a	  bill	  of	  $130	  billion;	  in	  total	  $547	  billion.	  	  What	  would	  have	  happened	  is	  that	  for	  the	  lowest	  fifth	  income	  group	  this	  would	  have	  meant	  an	  income	  increase	  of	  11.47%	  over	  their	  average	  household	  income	  of	  $17,700.	  For	  the	  second	  fifth	  with	  an	  average	  income	  of	  $38,000	  it	  would	  have	  meant	  an	   income	  injection	  of	  5.34%.	  For	  the	  third	   fifth	   it	  meant	  an	   injection	  of	  3.67%	   over	   their	   median	   income	   of	   $55,300;	   for	   the	   fourth	   fifth	   a	   2.61%	  injection	  and	  for	  the	  top	  fifth	  a	  1.02%	  injection.	  	  The	   2008	   cash	   injection	  would	   have	   implied	   a	   1.61%	  growth	   incentive,	   as	   the	  GDP	   for	   the	  year	  was	  $14.72	   trillion.	  However	   the	   consumption	  multiplier	  and	  the	   changed	   perception	   about	   doubtful	   debtors	   would	   likely	   have	   made	   the	  results	  more	  significant.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  would	  have	  had	  on	  its	  books	  would	  not	  be	  a	  claim	   on	   individual	   households,	   but	   on	   the	   whole	   economy,	   represented	   by	  future	  government	  revenues.	  Instead	  of	  spending	  a	  full	  $2.4	  trillion	  on	  past	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/acs-­‐09.pdf	  7	  http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-­‐235.pdf	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  debt	   through	  Quantitative	  Easing,	  about	  $550	  billion	  could	  have	  been	  spent	  on	  basis	  of	  future	  government	  cash-­‐in	  flows.	  In	  other	  words	  the	  Houses	  of	  Congress	  could	  have	  authorized	  that	  the	  Fed	  could	  reclaim	  the	  individual	  household	  cash	  injection	  from	  future	  government	  revenues	  over	  a	  period	  of	  say	  ten	  years.	  	  What	  is	  important	  in	  the	  EGIM	  method	  is	  that	  lower-­‐income	  families	  are	  helped	  much	   more	   percentage	   wise	   than	   the	   better	   off	   ones.	   This	   makes	   perfect	  economic	  sense,	  as	  the	  lower-­‐income	  families	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  generally	  suffer	  most	   from	  a	  recession	  period.	  What	   is	  also	   important	   is	   that	   the	  EGIM	  method	  focuses	  on	  the	  cash	  shortfall	  that	  borrowers	  experience,	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  their	  own,	   when	   lenders	   collectively	   provide	   excessive	   lending	   levels,	   which	   causes	  house	  prices	  to	  rise	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  level.	  	  Some	   of	   the	   cash	   provided	   to	   individual	   households	  would	   have	   been	   used	   to	  service	   outstanding	  mortgages.	   The	   result	   would	   have	   been	   fewer	   foreclosure	  proceedings	  and	   less	  home	  repossessions.	   It	  would	  also	  mean	   that	   the	  affected	  households	  would	  have	  more	   funds	   to	  spend	  on	  other	  goods	  and	  services.	  The	  households	   not	   affected	   by	  mortgage	   repayments	   would	   have	  more	  money	   to	  spend	  on	  goods	  and	  services.	  A	  campaign	  to	  encourage	  the	  population	  to	  use	  the	  funds	  for	  “economic	  stimulus”	  consumption	  should	  convince	  most	  households	  to	  follow	  suit.	  	  The	  above	  use	  of	  a	  4,	  3	  and	  2%	  was	  only	  to	  illustrate	  how	  an	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  could	  work.	  If	  the	  EGIM	  system	  would	  be	  used,	  it	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  prerogative	  of	   the	   legislature	   together	  with	   the	  Central	  bank	   to	   choose	   the	  appropriate	   level	   of	   cash	   advance	   for	   all	   individual	   households	   or	   for	   specific	  income	  categories.	  	  The	  United	  States	  has	  already	  gone	  through	  their	  adjustment	  period	  of	  6	  years	  since	   the	   start	   of	   2008.	   Europe	   and	   especially	   the	  Eurozone	  have	  not	   adjusted	  yet.	  The	  EGIM	  method	  is	  not	  only	  applicable	  to	  the	  U.S.	  for	  future	  use,	  but	  can	  be	  applied	  by	  the	  ECB	  for	  all	  Eurozone	  countries.	  	  	  The	   effects	   of	   a	   government	   debt	   crisis,	   like	   the	   one	   in	   Greece,	   should	   also	   be	  considered	   in	   the	   light	   of	   an	   overfunding-­‐underfunding	   cycle,	   whereby	   the	  individual	   households	   are	   clearly	   the	   underfunded	   people	   in	   the	   country.	  Helping	   these	   households	  with	   a	   cash	   injection	  will	   do	  wonders	   for	   economic	  growth	   and	   for	   government	   finances.	   Restructuring	   government	   debt	   does	   not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  mean	  forcing	  a	  country	  into	  an	  economic	  decline.	  	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  Chorleywood,	  U.K.	  3rd	  	  March	  2015	  E-­‐mail:	  keesdekoning008@hotmail.com	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